- False flagging is increasingly used by the shadow fleet to evade sanctions, leaving hundreds of vessels effectively stateless and outside international maritime regulation.
- Fraudulent registries and forged certification undermine flag state oversight, raising serious risks for safety, environmental protection, and crew welfare.
- Growing enforcement by western authorities is likely to push sanctioned vessels toward reflagging under states such as Russia, rather than operating without a recognised nationality.
All vessels are required to sail under a flag, providing them with a nationality and legal jurisdiction for their operations in international waters. The flag state is responsible for ensuring the shipowner adheres to international maritime regulations, including those surrounding crew safety, operational safety, environmental protection, and labour standards.
Any country has the right to authorise vessels to fly their flag, even one that is not a member of the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), the United Nations (UN) specialised agency concerning shipping. By exercising this right, however, the country must implement the various obligations arising from being a flag state.
Flagging a vessel is a nation’s confirmation that the ship meets its national requirements and demonstrates that certain responsibilities are assumed by the flag state, including legal registration and periodic surveys.
False flagging is a term often associated with the shadow fleet. It is a deceptive shipping practice where a vessel misrepresents its nationality by sailing under a nation’s flag without the required authority.
False flagging is not a new phenomenon, but incidents have been increasing in response to Western sanctions targeting the shadow fleet. The issue is headlining an upcoming legal sub-committee meeting at the IMO.
The flag performance table
Each year, the International Chamber of Shipping releases a flag state performance table. It provides an analysis of the extent to which flag state administrations adhere to their responsibilities to follow global standards and regulations governing safety, environmental protection, and employment conditions.
Due to pressure from regulators, reputational considerations, and potential financial penalties, most flag registries are extremely reluctant to allow sanctioned vessels to enter their fleet. Most will also immediately deregister any vessels that have been added to a sanction list.
Faced with limited options for legitimately flagging their sanctioned vessel, a shipowner may resort to a false flag, claiming to sail under a nation’s flag without their knowledge or consent. Middlemen, allegedly representing a flag state, issue forged registration documents and false flag certificates, claiming the vessel has been legitimately registered.
The practice has become synonymous with the shadow fleet, sanctions evasion, deceptive shipping practices and opaque ownership. In February 2026, the IMO reported 529 vessels as flying false flags. Operating under a false flag voids the vessels’ insurance and classification and leaves them outside the rules of maritime governance; they are effectively stateless.
The concern surrounding these vessels is well placed. Without genuine flag state oversight, the vessels are often poorly maintained, posing operational and environmental risks, and have low standards regarding crew welfare.
The IMO circulated a list of the most often seen false flags:
| Flag state | No. of false ships | Flag state | No. of false ships | |
| Comoros | 83 | Benin | 13 | |
| Guyana | 74 | Democratic Republic of the Congo | 13 | |
| Guinea | 39 | Equatorial Guinea | 13 | |
| Aruba | 35 | Tonga | 13 | |
| Curacao | 32 | Fuji | 12 | |
| Madagascar | 19 | Timor-Leste | 12 | |
| Cook Islands | 18 | Togo | 11 | |
| Mali | 17 | Malawi | 8 | |
| Sint Maarten | 17 | Gambia | 6 | |
| Eswatini | 15 | Mozambique | 6 | |
| São Tomé e Príncipe | 14 | Tanzania | 4 |
Following reputational and regulatory pressure, Several nations have now stated their position to the IMO. Among them, Aruba, Benin, Botswana, Guinea, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Sint Maarten, Timor-Leste, Tonga, and Zimbabwe have all formally confirmed they do not operate an international ship registry.
Benin provided the IMO a list of 33 tankers it advised were fraudulently operating under the Beninese flag using falsified certificates. Tonga advised that its international ship register was terminated in 2002, and no foreign-owned vessels were entitled to fly the Tongan flag.
The government of Eswatini also stated it does not have an international ship register and advised its registry had been operating without authorisation. The African state is not a member of the IMO and has not ratified or implemented any IMO conventions. In December 2025, the Eswatini government even called on maritime authorities to arrest any vessel flying the Eswatini flag.
Other flag states, including Comoros, Gambia, and Madagascar, have warned of fraudulent or forged certificates issued in their name by unauthorised persons. Several vessels have since been deregistered as a result; Bermuda also warned that several vessels appeared to be using fraudulent Bermuda MMSI numbers.
Why does this matter?
It is important to emphasise that a vessel can only enjoy freedom of navigation on the high seas if it has a nationality: it must be under the jurisdiction and control of a state. A vessel without any confirmed nationality is deemed stateless and enjoys no protection under international law. This was recently cited by the US as justification for the seizure of several tankers.
The way shadow fleet vessels are registered is now likely to change following the US’ willingness to pursue and seize sanctioned, stateless vessels. In January, several European governments also threatened action against vessels unable to demonstrate their nationality, leading to several detentions.
Reports predict many sanctioned tankers will now reflag to Russia. A sanctioned tanker sailing under the Russian flag will likely indicate her intent, but the consensus seems to be it’s safer to operate under Russian protection than risk detention or seizure. This is just the most recent example of the evolution of the shadow fleet, which has repeatedly changed the way it operates in response to Western sanctions.
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In the current climate, it will be difficult to ever fully eradicate the shadow fleet. Russia and Iran are heavily reliant on energy exports, and sanctions place most of the compliant fleet and related maritime services beyond their reach. There is too much at stake for the Russian and Iranian economies, so, for the time being at least, the shadow fleet will remain.
